IT : Proviso inserted by Finance Act, 2012 in section 40(a)(ia) is declaratory and curative in nature and therefore, it should be given retrospective effect from 1-4-2005

IT : In view of order passed by Allahabad High Court in case of CIT v. Vector Shipping Services (P.) Ltd. 218 Taxman 93/38 taxmann.com 77, it was to be concluded that provisions of section 40(a)(ia) were applicable only to amount of expenditure which were payable as on 31st March, of every year and it could not be invoked to disallow expenses which had been actually paid during previous year without deduction of TDS

[2014] 48 taxmann.com 402 (Bangalore - Trib.)

IN THE ITAT BANGALORE BENCH 'B'

Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle 1, Udupi

v.

Ananda Marakala*

N.V. VASUDEVAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER
AND JASON P. BOAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
IT APPEAL NO. 1584 (BANG.) OF 2012
CO.NO. 58 (BANG.) OF 2013
[ASSESSMENT YEAR 2005-06]
SEPTEMBER 13, 2013

Section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Business disallowance - Amount payable to a contractor or sub-contractor - Assessment year 2005-06 - Whether proviso inserted by Finance Act, 2012 in section 40(a)(ia) is declaratory and curative in nature and therefore, it should be given retrospective effect from 1-4-2005 - Held, yes - Whether in view of order passed by Allahabad High Court in case of CIT v. Vector Shipping Services (P.) Ltd. 218 Taxman 93/38 taxmann.com 77, it was to be concluded that provisions of section 40(a)(ia) were applicable only to amount of expenditure which were payable as on 31st March, of every year and it could not be invoked to disallow expenses which had been actually paid during previous year without deduction of TDS - Held, yes [Para 30] [In favour of assessee]

FACTS

- The assessee was a PWD registered contractor carrying on the business of civil construction. He was awarded Govt. contracts for construction of canals etc. For the purpose of executing the work, the assessee engaged certain sub-contractors.
- In the course of assessment proceedings for the assessment year 2005-06, the Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee had made payments to the sub-contractor for carrying out works on its behalf.
- Since the assessee had not deducted tax at source on such payments, the Assessing Officer invoking the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) disallowed the claim of the assessee for deduction of the aforesaid sum while computing income from business.

- The assessee challenged said disallowance contending that as on the last date of the previous year relevant to assessment year 2005-06, the amounts due and payable to the alleged sub-contractors had been paid and nothing remained payable.
- The assessee also submitted that sub-contractors had included the payments received by the assessee as part of their income and taxes due had been paid by them and therefore there was no loss to the revenue.
- The Commissioner (Appeals) relying upon decision of the Special Bench of ITAT in the case of *Merilyn Shipping Transport* v. *Addl. CIT* [2012] 136 ITD 23/20 taxmann.com 244 (Vishakhapatnam), held that provisions of section 40(a)(ia) were applicable only to the amount of expenditure which were payable as on 31st March of every year and it could not be invoked to disallow which had been actually paid during the previous year without deduction of TDS.
- Accordingly, the Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the disallowance made by Assessing Officer.
- On revenue's appeal:

HELD

- The Finance Act, 2008 brought out amendment to section 40(a)(ia) w.e.f. 1-4-2005 by relaxing earlier position to some extent. It made two categories of defaults causing disallowance on the basis of the period of the previous year in which tax was deductible. The first category of disallowances included the cases in which tax was deductible and was so deducted during the last month of the previous year but there was failure to pay such tax on or before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139 of the Act.
- In other words, if any amount on which tax was deductible during last month of the previous year, that is March, 2005, but was paid before 31-10-2005, being the due date u/s 139(1), the deductibility of the amount was kept intact. The second category included cases other than those given in category first. To put it simply, if tax was deductible and was so deducted during the first eleven months of the previous year, that is, up to February, 2005, the disallowance was to be made if the assessee failed to pay it before 31-3-2005. [Para 15]
- Then came the amendment to section 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2010 with retrospective effect from 1-4-2010. [Para 16]
- From the provision as amended by the Finance Act, 2010 with retrospective effect from 1-4-2010 it can be seen that the only difference which this amendment has made is dispensing with the earlier two categories of defaults as per the Finance Act, 2008, as discussed in the earlier para, causing disallowance on the basis of the period of the previous year during which tax was deductible. The first category of disallowances included the cases in which tax was deductible and was so deducted during the last month of the previous year but there was failure to pay such tax on or before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139. The Finance Act, 2010 has not tinkered with this position.
- The second category of the Finance Act, 2008 which required the deposit of tax before the close of the previous year in case of deduction during the first eleven months, as a precondition for the grant of deduction in the year of incurring expenditure, has been altered. The hitherto requirement of the assessee deducting tax at source during the

first eleven months of the previous year and paying it before the close of the previous year up to 31st March, of the previous year as a requirement for grant of deduction in the year of incurring such expenditure, has been eased to extend such time for payment of tax up to due date u/s 139(1) of the Act.

- As per the new amendment, the disallowance will be made if after deducting tax at source, the assessee fails to pay the amount of tax on or before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139 of the Act. The effect of this amendment is that now the assessee deducting tax either in the last month of the previous year or first eleven months of the previous year shall be entitled to deduction of the expenditure in the year of incurring it, if the tax so deducted at source is paid on or before the due date u/s 139(1). This is the only difference which has been made by the Finance Act, 2010.[Para 17]
- Further liberalization of provisions of section 40(a)(ia) was made through amendment brought by the Finance Act, 2012. With a view to liberalize provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act Finance Act, 2012 brought amendment with effect from 1-4-2013. [Para 21]
- The provisions of section 40(a)(ia) are meant to ensure that the Assessee's perform their obligation to deduct tax at source in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Such compliance will ensure revenue collection without much hassle. When the object sought to be achieved by those provisions are found to be achieved, it would be unjust to disallowance legitimate business expenses of an assessee. Despite due collection of taxes due, if disallowance of genuine business expenses are made than that would be unjust enrichment on the part of the Government as the payee would have also paid the taxes on such income. In order to remove this anomaly, this amendment has been introduced. In case of payment to non-resident, the government does not have any other mechanism to recover the due taxes. Hence, no amendment was made in section 40(a)(i). The legislature has not given blanket deduction under section 40(a)(ia). The deduction as per amended section will be allowed only if the -

(*i*) payee has furnished his return of income under section 139;

(*ii*) payee has taken into account such sum for computing income in such return of income; and

(*iii*) payee has paid the tax due on the income declared by him in such return of income,

and the payer furnishes a certificate to this effect from an accountant in such form as may be prescribed. [Para 24]

- The question is as to whether the amendment made as above is prospective or retrospective w.e.f. 1-4-2005 when the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) were introduced. Keeping in view the purpose behind the proviso inserted by the Finance Act, 2012 in section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, it can be said to be declaratory and curative in nature and therefore, should be given retrospective effect from 1-4-2005, being the date from which sub-clause (ia) of section 40(a) was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004. [Para 25]
- In *CIT* v. *Sikandarkhan N. Tunvar* [2014] 220 Taxman 256/[2013] 33 taxmann.com 133 (Guj.), the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court held that in *Merilyn Shipping & Transport* (*supra*) the majority held that as the Finance Bill proposed the words "amount credited or paid" and as the Finance Act used the words "amounts payable", section 40(a)(ia)

could only apply to amounts that are outstanding as of 31st March, and not to amounts already paid during the year. This view is not correct for two reasons. Firstly, a strict reading of section 40(a)(ia) shows that all that it requires is that there should be an amount payable of the nature described, which is such on which tax is deductible at source but such tax has not been deducted or if deducted not paid before the due date.

- The provision nowhere requires that the amount which is payable must remain so payable throughout during the year. If the assessee's interpretation is accepted, it would lead to a situation where the assessee who though was required to deduct the tax at source but no such deduction was made or more flagrantly deduction though made is not paid to the Government, would escape the consequence only because the amount was already paid over before the end of the year in contrast to another assessee who would otherwise be in similar situation but in whose case the amount remained payable till the end of the year. There is no logic why the legislature would have desired to bring about such irreconcilable and diverse consequences.
- Secondly, the principle of deliberate or conscious omission is applied mainly when an existing provision is amended and a change is brought about. The Special Bench was wrong in comparing the language used in the draft bill to that used in the final enactment to assign a particular meaning to section 40(a)(ia). Accordingly, *Merilyn Shipping & Transport* (*supra*) does not lay down correct law. The correct law is that section 40(a)(ia) covers not only to the amounts which are payable as on 31st March, of a particular year but also which are payable at any time during the year. The Hon'ble Kolkatta High Court in *CIT* v. *Md.Jakir Hossai Mondal* [2013] 33 taxman.com 123 did not agree with the view of the Special Bench in the case of *Merilyn Shipping* following its judgment on 3rd April, 2013 in ITAT No. 20 of 2013, G.A. No. 190 of 2013 (*CIT, Kolkata-XI* v. *Crescent Export Syndicates* [2013] 216 Taxman 258/33 taxmann.com 250 (Cal.) holding that the views expressed in the case of *Merilyn Shipping & Transports* (*supra*) were not acceptable. [Para 28]
- However, the Allahabad High Court has however upheld the view taken by the Special Bench ITAT in the case of *Merilyn Shipping & Transports* (*supra*) in the case of *CIT* v. *Vector Shipping Servcies (P.) Ltd.* [2013] 357 ITR 642/218 Taxman 93/38 taxmann.com 77 (All.) [Para 29]
- Thus there are two views on the issue, one in favour of the assessee expressed by the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court and the other against the assessee expressed by the Gujarat & Calcutta High Courts. Admittedly, there is no decision rendered by the jurisdictional High Court on this issue. In the given circumstances, following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of *CIT* v. *Vegetable Products Ltd.* [1993] 88 ITR 192 (SC), it is held that where two views are possible on an issue, the view in favour of the assessee has to be preferred. Following the decision of the High Court, the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) is upheld. [Para 30]
- In the result, the appeal by the revenue is dismissed, while the cross-objection by the assessee is allowed. [Para 31]

CASES REFERRED TO

Merilyn Shipping Transport v. *Addl. CIT* [2012] 136 ITD 23/20 taxmann.com 244 (Vishakhapatnam)(SB) (para 7), *CIT* v. *Sikandarkhan N. Tunvar* [2014] 220 Taxman 256/[2013] 33 taxmann.com 133 (Guj.) (para 9), *CIT* v. *Md.Jakir Hossai Mondal* [2013] 33 taxman.com 123 (Cal.) (para 9), *CIT* v. *Vector Shipping Servcies (P.) Ltd.* [2013] 357 ITR 642/218 Taxman 93/38 taxmann.com 77 (All.) (para 10), *CIT*

v. *Vegetable Products Ltd.* [1993] 88 ITR 192 (SC) (para 10), *Allied Motors (P.) Ltd.* v. *CIT* [1997] 224 ITR 677/91 Taxman 205 (SC) (para 11), *CIT* v. *Alom Extrusions Ltd*. [2009] 319 ITR 306/185 Taxman 416 (SC) (para 11), *Bharati Shipyard Ltd*. v. *Dy. CIT* [2011] 132 ITD 53/13 taxmann.com 101 (Mum.)(SB) (para 18), *Virgin Creations* v. *ITO* [IT Appeal No. 267(Kol.)of 2009] (para 19), *CIT* v. *Alom Extrusions Ltd.* [2009] 319 ITR 306/185 Taxman 416 (SC) (para 25) and *CIT* v. *Crescent Export Syndicates* [2013] 216 Taxman 258/33 taxmann.com 250 (Cal.) (para 28).

Praveen Karanth *for the Appellant.* **Narendra Sharma** *for the Respondent.*

ORDER

N.V. Vasudevan, Judicial Member - ITA No. 1584/12 is an appeal by the revenue against the order dated 14.09.2012 of the CIT(A), Mysore relating to A.Y. 2005-06. In this appeal, the assessee has challenged the order of the CIT(A) whereby the CIT(A) deleted an addition of Rs. 1,32,33,452 made by the AO invoking the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [hereinafter referred to as "the Act"] for the assessee's failure to deduct tax at source u/s. 194C(2)of the Act.

2. The assessee has filed a Cross-Objection in which the assessee has raised an issue that the statutory amendment to the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act by the Finance Act, 2012 w.e.f. 1.4.2013 is applicable retrospectively from 1.4.2005 and therefore the disallowance made u/s.40(a)(ia) of the Act deserves to be deleted applying the law as amended.

3. The factual details with regard to the appeal and cross-objection are as follows. The assessee is an individual. He is a PWD registered contractor carrying on the business of civil construction. He was awarded Govt, contracts for construction of canals etc. For the purpose of executing the work, the assessee engaged certain contractors. In the course of assessment proceedings for the AY 2005-06, the AO noticed that the assessee had made payment of RS.99,95,152 to Sri Dayananda Amin and a sum of Rs.32,38,300 to D.Y. Uppar. According to the AO, the aforesaid payments were made to the sub-contractor by the assessee for carrying out works on behalf of the assessee and therefore the assessee was under an obligation to deduct tax at source on such payments under the provisions of section 194C(2) of the Act. Since the assessee had not deducted tax at source on such payments, the AO invoking the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act disallowed the claim of the assessee for deduction of the aforesaid sum while computing income from business. Accordingly, income from business stood enhanced by the amount disallowed by the AO.

4. On appeal by the assessee, the CIT(A) confirmed the order of the AO.

5. On further appeal by the assessee, the ITAT in ITA No.420/Bang/2009 by its order dated 26.4.2010 remanded the question regarding applicability of the provisions of section 194C(2) of the Act to the payments in question. In the order passed by the AO pursuant to order of the Tribunal, the AO held that the payments made by the assessee fell within the ambit of section 194C of the Act and that the assessee was under an obligation to deduct tax at source.

6. The assessee has been taking a stand even before the AO that as on the last date of the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2005-06, the amounts due and payable to the alleged sub-contractors had been paid and nothing remained payable. The assessee also submitted that Shri Dayananda Amin and Shri D.Y. Uppar have filed the returns of income for the A.Y. 2005-06 and have included the payments received by the assessee as part of their income declared in such returns of income. The assessee also pointed out that taxes due have been paid by them and, therefore, there is no loss to the revenue. These facts have not been controverted or disputed by the AO.

7. The assessee challenged the findings of the AO before the CIT(A). Before the CIT(A), one of the

contentions raised by the assessee was that the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) provides for non-deduction of amount which remains payable to a resident. It is not applicable where expenditure is paid. It is applicable only in cases where payments are due and outstanding. The CIT(A) proceeded to decide the appeal of the assessee on the basis of a decision of Special Bench of ITAT in the case of *Merilyn Shipping Transport* v. *Addl. CIT* [2012] 136 ITD 23/20 taxmann.com 244 (Vishakhapatnam)(SB). The relevant observations of the CIT(A) in this regard were as follows:—

> '10.1 I have gone through the decision of Special Bench of Hon'ble ITAT Visakapatnam in the above case. In that case, the issue was on the payment of brokerage expenses and commission without deducing TDS. Except that, in the case of the appellant the payments are on account of sub-contract payment. I find that the facts are identical and hence I am of the view that the decision of Hon'ble Special Bench of Visakapatnam Tribunal is on similar facts of the case of the appellant. This decision is also accepted by Hon'ble ITAT Bangalore Bench. The Hon'ble Tribunal analyzed the intention of the Legislature in removing the phrase "paid" or "credited" that were in the Bill and finally retained only "payable". After detailed analysis which was concluded by majority by the Hon'ble Special Bench that the Legislature consciously replaced the word "amounts credited or paid" with the word "payable" in the final enactment. By this, the Legislative intend has been made clear that only outstanding amounts are the provisions for expenses liable for TDS under Chapter XVII-B of the Act is sought to be disallowed in the event there is a default in following the obligations casted upon the assessee under Chapter XVII-B of the Act. While interpreting the word "payable" in section 40(a)(ia), the meaning of the word statute must be understood in its natural, ordinary or popular sense and constitute according to the grammatical meaning. The word "payable" used in Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act is to be assigned strict interpretation in view of the object of legislation which is intended from the replacement of the words in the proposed and enacted provision from the word "amount credited or paid" to "payable". In view of the detailed analyses and the above findings of the Hon'ble ITAT, it was held by majority that the provisions of Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act are applicable only to the amount of expenditure which are payable as on 31st March, of every year and it cannot be invoked to disallow which had been actually paid during the previous year without deduction of TDS.
>
> 10.2 I also find strength in the argument of the appellant that in the other provisions like sub clauses in Section 40(a)(ic) and 40(a)(iia) the wording used are "paid" unlike the word 'payable' used in section 40(a)(ia) makes it clear that both the words are to be read in the natural context. In fact this aspect is also analyzed in details by Hon'ble Special Bench. In view of the decision of the Hon'ble Special Bench being followed by Hon'ble ITAT Bangalore which is binding, I direct the AO to apply the provisions of Section 40(a)(ia) for the amounts shown as payable as on 31st March of the previous year.'

8. Aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A), the revenue has preferred the present appeal before the Tribunal. The assessee has filed a cross objection in which the assessee has amongst other grounds, submitted that the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act were not applicable to the facts of the assessee's case since the recipient payee has already declared the payments made by the assessee in their respective returns. Hence no disallowance is warranted under the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act.

9. The Id. DR submitted that the decision of the Hon'ble Special Bench ITAT in the case of *Merilyn Shipping & Transports* (*supra*) has been reversed by the Hon'ble Gujarat and Calcutta High Courts in *CIT* v. *Sikandarkhan N. Tunvar* [2014] 220 Taxman 256/[2013] 33 taxmann.com 133 and in *CIT* v. *Md.Jakir Hossai Mondal* [2013] 33 taxmann.com 123 respectively.

10. The ld. counsel for the assessee pointed out that the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in the case of *CIT* v. *Vector Shipping Services (P.) Ltd.* [2013] 357 ITR 642/218 Taxman 93/38 taxmann.com 77 (All.) has however upheld the decision of the Special Bench of the ITAT. The Id. counsel submitted that where two

views are possible, the view in favour of the assessee should be accepted and in this regard relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of *CIT* v. *Vegetables Products* [1973] 88 ITR 192.

11. On the cross objection filed by the assessee, the Id. counsel for the assessee drew our attention to the insertion to the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of the Act by the Finance Act, 2012 w.e.f. 1.4.2013 and submitted that where tax is paid by the recipient then no disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) should be made as per the second proviso referred to above. It was his submission that the aforesaid proviso though stated to be w.e.f. 1.4.2013 should be construed as having operation with retrospective effect from 1.4.2005 when the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act were first introduced. It was his submission that the provisions are intended to remove hardship which was never contemplated and therefore should be construed as having retrospective operation. In this regard, reliance was placed by the Id. counsel for the assessee on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of *Allied Motors (P.) Ltd.* v. *CIT* [1997] 224 ITR 677/91 Taxman 205 and in the case of *CIT* v. *Alom Extrusions Ltd*. [2009] 319 ITR 306/185 Taxman 416 (SC) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the context of amendments to the provisions of section 43B of the Act took the view that the amendment were intended to remove hardship and though they were not stated to be retrospective in operation, will apply retrospectively.

12. The Id. DR submitted that it is not possible to infer retrospectivity of operation unless specifically said so by the legislature. According to him, had the legislature wanted the provisions to apply retrospectively, they would have said so specifically. In the absence of such intention of the legislature having been expressed, it is not possible to construe the amendment as having retrospective operation.

13. We have considered the rival submissions. As far as the cross objection is concerned, the question for our consideration is as to whether section 40(a)(ia) amended by the Finance Act, 2012 with effect from 01.04.2013 is retrospective from 01.04.2005 or prospective from the date specified.

14. In order to find answer to this question, it would be relevant to note down the legislative history of the provision. Section 40 has certain clauses providing for the amounts which are not deductible. Sub-clause (ia) of clause (a) of section 40 was inserted by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2004 with effect from 1st April, 2005 reading as under:—

> '40. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in sections 30 to 38, the following amounts shall not be deducted in computed the income chargeable under the head "Profits and gains of business or profession'—
>
> ** ** **
>
> (*ia*) any interest, commission or brokerage, fees for professional services or fees for technical services payable to a resident, or amounts payable to a contractor or sub-contractor, being resident, for carrying out any work (including supply of labour for carrying out any work), on or, after deduction, has not been paid during the previous year, or in the subsequent year before the expiry of the time prescribed under sub-section (1) of section 200:
>
> Provided that where in respect of any such sum, tax has been deducted in any subsequent year or, has been deducted in the previous year but paid in any subsequent year after the expiry of the time prescribed under sub-section (1) of section 200, such sum shall be allowed as a deduction in computing the income of the previous year in which such tax has been paid.
>
> *Explanation*. — For the purposes of this sub-clause, —
>
> (*i*) "commission or brokerage" shall have the same meaning as in clause (i) of the Explanation to section 194H;
>
> (*ii*) "fees for technical services" shall have the same meaning as in Explanation 2

to clause (vii) of sub-section (1) of section 9;

(*iii*) "professional services" shall have the same meaning as in clause (a) of the Explanation to section 194J;

(*iv*) "work" shall have the same meaning as in Explanation III to section 194C;'

The Memorandum explaining the provisions in the Finance Bill explained the rationale of the insertion of the new provision in following words :—

> "With a view to augment compliance of TDS provisions, it is proposed to extend the provisions of section 40(a)(i) to payments of interest, commission or brokerage, fees for professional services or fees for technical services to residents, and payments to a resident contractor or sub-contractor for carrying out any work (including supply of labour for carrying out any work), on which tax has not been deducted or after deduction, has not been paid before the expiry of the time prescribed under sub-section (1) of section 200 and in accordance with the other provisions of Chapter XVII-B. It is also proposed to provide that where in respect of payment of any sum, tax has been deducted under Chapter XVII-B or paid in any subsequent year, the sum of payment shall be allowed in computing the income of the previous year in which such tax has been paid.
>
> The proposed amendment will take effect from 1st day of April, 2005 and will, accordingly, apply in relation to the assessment year 2005- 2006 and subsequent years. [Clause 11]"

Thereafter the Finance Act, 2008 made amendment to clause (a) in sub-clause (ia) in section 40 with retrospective effect from 1st April, 2005. The section as amended by the Finance Act, 2008 read as under:—

> "(*ia*) any interest, commission or brokerage, rent, royalty, fees for professional services or fees for technical services payable to a resident, or amounts payable to a contractor or sub-contractor, being resident, for carrying out any work (including supply of labour for carrying out any work), on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B and such tax has not been paid,-
>
> (A) in a case where the tax was deductible and was so deducted during the last month of the previous year, on or before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139 ; or
>
> (B) in any other case, on or before the last day of the previous year.
>
> Provided that where in respect of any such sum, tax has been deducted in any subsequent year, or has been deducted—
>
> (A) during the last month of the previous year but paid after the said due date ; or
>
> (B) during any other month of the previous year but paid after the end of the said previous year, such sum shall be allowed as a deduction in computing the income of the previous year in which such tax has been paid."

15. The Finance Act, 2008 brought out amendment to section 40(a)(ia) w.r.e.f. 1.4.2005 by relaxing earlier position to some extent. It made two categories of defaults causing disallowance on the basis of the period of the previous year in which tax was deductible. The first category of disallowances included the cases in which tax was deductible and was so deducted during the last month of the previous year but there was failure to pay such tax on or before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139 of the Act. In other words, if any amount on which tax was deductible during last month of the previous year, that is March 2005, but was paid before 31st October, 2005, being the due date u/s 139(1), the deductibility of the amount was kept intact. The second category included cases other than those given in category first. To put it simply, if tax was deductible and was so deducted during the first eleven months of the previous

year, that is, up to February, 2005, the disallowance was to be made if the assessee failed to pay it before 31st March, 2005.

16. Then came the amendment to section 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2010 with retrospective effect from 1st April, 2010. The provision so amended, now reads as under :—

> "(*ia*) any interest, commission or brokerage, rent, royalty, fees for professional services or fees for technical services payable to a resident, or amounts payable to a contractor or sub-contractor, being resident, for carrying out any work (including supply of labour for carrying out any work), on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B and such tax has not been deducted or; after deduction, has not been paid on or before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139
>
> Provided that where in respect of any such sum, tax has been deducted in any subsequent year, or has been deducted during the previous year but paid after the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139, such sum shall be allowed as a deduction in computing the income of the previous year in which such tax has been paid."

17. From the above provision as amended by the Finance Act, 2010 with retrospective effect from 1st April, 2010 it can be seen that the only difference which this amendment has made is dispensing with the earlier two categories of defaults as per the Finance Act, 2008, as discussed in the earlier para, causing disallowance on the basis of the period of the previous year during which tax was deductible. The first category of disallowances included the cases in which tax was deductible and was so deducted during the last month of the previous year but there was failure to pay such tax on or before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139. The Finance Act, 2010 has not tinkered with this position. The second category of the Finance Act, 2008 which required the deposit of tax before the close of the previous year in case of deduction during the first eleven months, as a pre-condition for the grant of deduction in the year of incurring expenditure, has been altered. The hitherto requirement of the assessee deducting tax at source during the first eleven months of the previous year and paying it before the close of the previous year up to 3 1st March of the previous year as a requirement for grant of deduction in the year of incurring such expenditure, has been eased to extend such time for payment of tax up to due date u/s 139(1) of the Act. As per the new amendment, the disallowance will be made if after deducting tax at source, the assessee fails to pay the amount of tax on or before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139 of the Act. The effect of this amendment is that now the assessee deducting tax either in the last month of the previous year or first eleven months of the previous year shall be entitled to deduction of the expenditure in the year of incurring it, if the tax so deducted at source is paid on or before the due date u/s 139(1). This is the only difference which has been made by the Finance Act, 2010.

18. The question as to whether the Amendment by the Finance Act, 2010 as aforesaid is prospective or retrospective from 1.4.2005 came up for consideration before the Mumbai Special Bench ITAT in the case of *Bharati Shipyard Ltd*. v. *Dy. CIT* [2011] 132 ITD 53/13 taxmann.com 101. Before the Special Bench, it was argued that the amendment was made with a view to remove the unnecessary hardship caused to the assessee by the earlier provision. The Special Bench by its order dated 9.9.2011, however, held that the amendment carried out by the Finance Act, 2010 with retrospective effect from assessment year 2010-2011 cannot be held to be retrospective from assessment year 2005-2006. The Special Bench held that the amendment brought out by the Finance Act, 2010 to section 40(a)(ia) w.e.f. 01.04.2010, is not remedial and curative in nature.

19. Prior to the decision of the Special Bench, identical issue had come up for consideration before the ITAT Kolkata Bench in the case of *Virgin Creations* v. *ITO*, IT Appeal No. 267/Kol/2009 for AY 05-06. The issue that arose for consideration was disallowance of expenses u/s.40(a)(ia) claimed as deduction while computing income from business being embroidery charges, dyeing charges, interest on loan and freight charges without deducting tax at source. The Embroidery charges were paid between 22nd may,

2004 to 30.11.2004. Tax had been deducted at source but were paid to the Government only on 28.10.2005 and not within the time contemplated by Section 200(1) of the Act. The dyeing charges were paid between 5.4.2004 to 20.8.2004. Tax was deducted at source but was paid to the Government only on 28.10.2005. Frieght outward charges were paid without deduction of tax at source. Interest on loans were credited to the creditors account on 31.3.2005 to the extent they were paid after the due date for filing return of income u/s. 139(1) of the Act, the disallowance was made u/s.40(a)(ia) of the Act. Before the Tribunal, the Assessee contented that the amendment by the Finance Act, 2010 with retrospective effect from 1st April, 2010 whereby amount of tax deducted at the time of making payment in respect of expenditure referred to in Sec.40(a)(ia) of the Act, if paid to the Government on or before the due date for filing the return of income due date u/s 139(1) of the Act should be allowed as a deduction. In other words it was argued that the amendment by the Finance Act, 2010 to the provisions of Sec.40(a)(ia) has to be held to be retrospective w.e.f. 1-4-2005. The ITAT Kolkata Bench by its order dated 15.12.2010, held as follows:

> "8. After hearing the rival submissions and on careful perusal of the materials available on record, keeping in view of the fact that though the Ld.D.R. submitted that the decisions of the Coordinate Benches are not binding and the Kolkata benches may take a different view, since Mumbai Bench after analyzing the provisions of Sec.40(a)(ia) since its inception and various amendments made to the same including the suggestion made by the Industry in the form of representation in their pre-budget memorandum to the Hon'ble Finance Minister and by applying the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Alom Extrusions Ltd., has observed that "The provisions of Section 40(a)(ia) as stood prior to the amendments made by the Finance Act, 2010 thus were resulting into unintended consequences and causing grave and genuine hardships to the assessees who had substantially complied with the relevant TDS provisions by deducting the tax at source and by paying the same to the credit of the Government before the due date of filing of their returns u/s. 139(1). In order to remedy this position and to remove the hardships which was being caused to the assessee belonging to such category, amendments have been made in the provisions of Section 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2010. The said amendments, in our opinion, thus are clearly remedial/curative in nature as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of *Allied Motors Pvt. Ltd.* (*supra*) and *Mom Extrusions Ltd.* (*supra*) and the same therefore would apply retrospectively w.e.f. 1st April, 2005. In the case of *R.B. Jodha Mal Kuthiala* 82 ITR 570, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that a proviso which is inserted to remedy unintended consequences and to make the provision workable, requires to be treated as retrospective in operation so that a reasonable interpretation can be given to the section as a whole. In the present case, the amount of tax deducted at source from the freight charges during the period 01/04/2005 to 28/02/2006 was paid by the Assessee in the month of July and August 2006 i.e., well before the due date of filing of its return of income for the year under consideration. This being the undisputed position, we hold that the disallowance made by the A.O. and confirmed by the learned CIT(A) on account of freight charges by invoking the provisions of Section 40(a)(ia) is not sustainable as per the amendments made in the said provisions by the Finance Act, 2010 which, being remedial/curative in nature, have retrospective application", we find no reason to deviate from the decisions of the ITAT's Mumbai Bench and Ahmedabad Bench, in the absence of a contrary view, except the other benches decisions or any other High Court. Therefore, respectfully following the decision of the *Coordinate Benches* (*supra*), we allow the ground nos. 1 to 3 of the assessee's appeal."

20. As against the aforesaid decision, the Revenue preferred appeal before the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court. The Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in ITA No. 302 of 2011, GA 3200/2011 decided on 23.11.2011, held as follows:

> "We have heard Mr. Nizamuddin and gone through the impugned judgment and order. We have also examined the point formulated for which the present appeal is sought to be admitted. It is argued by

Mr. Nizamuddin that this court needs to take decision as to whether section 40(A)(ia) is having retrospective operation or not.

The learned Tribunal on fact found that the assessee had deducted tax at source from the paid charges between the period April 1, 2005 and April 28, 2006 and the same were paid by the assessee in July and August 2006, i.e. well before the due date of filing of the return of income for the year under consideration. This factual position was undisputed. Moreover, the Supreme Court, as has been recorded by the learned Tribunal, in the case of Allied Motors Pvt. Ltd. and also in the case of Alom Extrusions Ltd., has already decided that the aforesaid provision has retrospective application. Again, in the case reported in 82 ITR 570, the Supreme Court held that the provision, which has inserted the remedy to make the provision workable, requires to be treated with retrospective operation so that reasonable deduction can be given to the section as well. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court, this court cannot decide otherwise. Hence we dismiss the appeal without any order as to costs."

21. Further liberalization of provisions of Section 40(a)(ia) was made through amendment brought by the Finance Act, 2012. With a view to liberalize provisions of Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act Finance Act, 2012 brought amendment w.e.f 01.04.2013 as under. The following second proviso shall be inserted in sub-clause (ia) of clause (a) of Section 40 by the Finance Act, 2012, w.e.f. 1-4-2013 :

"Provided further that where an assessee fails to deduct the whole or any part of the tax in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVII-B on any such sum but is not deemed to be an assessee in default under the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 201, then, for the purpose of this sub-clause, it shall be deemed that the assessee has deducted and paid the tax on such sum on the date of furnishing of return of income by the resident payee referred to in the said proviso."

22. Since provisions of Section 40(a)(ia) as amended by Finance Act, 2012 is linked to Section 201 of the Act, in which proviso was inserted, it is necessary to look into those provisions which read thus:

"Sec.201: (1) Where any person, including the principal officer of a company -

(*a*) who is required to deduct any sum in accordance with the provisions of this Act; or

(*b*) referred to in sub-section (1A) of Section 192, being an employer, does not deduct, or does not pay, or after so deducting fails to pay, the whole or any part of the tax, as required by or under this Act, then, such person, shall, without prejudice to any other consequences which he may incur, be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of such tax:

Provided that any person, including the principal officer of a company, who fails to deduct the whole or any part of the tax in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter on the sum paid to a resident or on the sum credited to the account of a resident shall not be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of such tax if such resident —

(*i*) has furnished his return of income under Section 139;

(*ii*) has taken into account such sum for computing income in such return of income; and

(*iii*) has paid the tax due on the income declared by him in such return of income, and the person furnishes a certificate to this effect from an accountant in such form as may be prescribed."

23. Memorandum explaining the provisions while introducing Finance Bill, 2012 provides the

justification of the amendment to section 40(a)(ia) in the following words:—

> "In order to rationalise the provisions of disallowance on account of non-deduction of tax from the payments made to a resident payee, it is proposed to amend section 40(a)(ia) to provide that where an assessee makes payment of the nature specified in the said section to a resident payee without deduction of tax and is not deemed to be an assessee in default under section 201(1) on account of payment of taxes by the payee, then, for the purpose of allowing deduction of such sum, it shall be deemed that the assessee has deducted and paid the tax on such sum on the date of furnishing of return of income by the resident payee."

24. The provisions of Sec.40(a)(ia) of the Act are meant to ensure that the Assessee's perform their obligation to deduct tax at source in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Such compliance will ensure revenue collection without much hassle. When the object sought to be achieved by those provisions are found to be achieved, it would be unjust to disallowance legitimate business expenses of an Assessee. Despite due collection of taxes due, if disallowance of genuine business expenses are made than that would be unjust enrichment on the part of the Government as the payee would have also paid the taxes on such income. In order to remove this anomaly, this amendment has been introduced. In case of payment to non resident, the government does not have any other mechanism to recover the due taxes. Hence, no amendment was made in section 40(a)(i). The legislature has not given blanket deduction under section 40(a)(ia). The deduction as per amended section will be allowed only if the —

(*i*) payee has furnished his return of income under section 139;

(*ii*) payee has taken into account such sum for computing income in such return of income; and

(*iii*) payee has paid the tax due on the income declared by him in such return of income,

and the payer furnishes a certificate to this effect from an accountant in such form as may be prescribed.

25. The question is as to whether the amendment made as above is prospective or retrospective w.e.f. 1.4.2005 when the provisions of Sec.40(a)(ia) were introduced. Keeping in view the purpose behind the proviso inserted by the Finance Act, 2012 in section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, it can be said to be declaratory and curative in nature and therefore, should be given retrospective effect from 1st April, 2005, being the date from which sub-clause (ia) of section 40(a) was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004. In *CIT* v. *Alom Extrusions Ltd.* [2009] 319 ITR 306/185 Taxman 416 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court had to deal with the question, whether omission (deletion) of the second proviso to s. 43B of the IT Act, 1961, by the Finance Act, 2003, operated w.e.f. 1st April, 2004, or whether it operated retrospectively w.e.f. 1st April, 1988? Prior to Finance Act, 2003, the second proviso to s. 43B of the IT Act, 1961 (for short, "the Act") restricted the deduction in respect of any sum payable by an employer by way of contribution to provident fund/superannuation fund or any other fund for the welfare of employees, unless it stood paid within the specified due date. According to the second proviso, the payment made by the employer towards contribution to provident fund or any other welfare fund was allowable as deduction, if paid before the date for filing the return of income and necessary evidence of such payment was enclosed with the return of income. In other words, if contribution stood paid after the date for filing of the return, it stood disallowed. This resulted in great hardship to the employers. They represented to the Government about their hardship and, consequently, pursuant to the report of the Kelkar Committee, the Government introduced Finance Act, 2003, by which the second proviso stood deleted w.e.f. 1st April, 2004, and certain changes were also made in the first proviso by which uniformity was brought about between payment of fees, taxes, cess, etc., on one hand and contribution made to Employees' Provident Fund, etc., on the other. According to the Department, the omission of the second proviso giving relief to the assessee(s) [employer(s)] operated only w.e.f. 1st April, 2004, whereas, according to the

assessee(s)-employer(s), the said Finance Act, 2003, to the extent indicated above, operated w.e.f. 1st April, 1988 (retrospectively). The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the deletion of the second proviso was retrospective w.e.f. 1.4.2004. The Court considered the scheme of the Act and the historical background and the object of introduction of the provisions of S. 43B. The Court also referred to the earlier amendments made in 1988 with introduction of the first and second provisos. The Court also noted further amendment made in 1989 in the second proviso dealing with the items covered in S. 43B(b) (i.e., contribution to employees welfare funds). After considering the same, the Court was of the view that it was clear that prior to the amendment of 2003, the employer was entitled to deduction only if the contribution stands credited on or before the due date given in the Provident Fund Act on account of second proviso to S. 43B. The situation created further difficulties and as a result of representations made by the industry, the amendment of 2003 was carried out which deleted the second proviso and also made first proviso applicable to contribution to employees welfare funds referred to in S. 43B(b).

> '15. We find no merit in these civil appeals filed by the Department for the following reasons : firstly, as stated above, s. 43B (main section), which stood inserted by Finance Act, 1983, w.e.f. 1st April, 1984, expressly commences with a non obstante clause, the underlying object being to disallow deductions claimed merely by making a book entry based on mercantile system of accounting. At the same time, s. 43B (main section) made it mandatory for the Department to grant deduction in computing the income under s. 28 in the year in which tax, duty, cess, etc., is actually paid. However, Parliament took cognizance of the fact that accounting year of a company did not always tally with the due dates under the Provident Fund Act, Municipal Corporation Act (octroi) and other tax laws. Therefore, by way of first proviso, an incentive/relaxation was sought to be given in respect of tax, duty, cess or fee by explicitly stating that if such tax, duty, cess or fee is paid before the date of filing of the return under the IT Act (due date), the assessee(s) then would be entitled to deduction. However, this relaxation/incentive was restricted only to tax, duty, cess and fee. It did not apply to contributions to labour welfare funds. The reason appears to be that the employer(s) should not sit on the collected contributions and deprive the workmen of the rightful benefits under social welfare legislations by delaying payment of contributions to the welfare funds. However, as stated above, the second proviso resulted in implementation problems, which have been mentioned hereinabove, and which resulted in the enactment of Finance Act, 2003, deleting the second proviso and bringing about uniformity in the first proviso by equating tax, duty, cess and fee with contributions to welfare funds. Once this uniformity is brought about in the first proviso, then, in our view, the Finance Act, 2003, which is made applicable by the Parliament only w.e.f. 1st April, 2004, would become curative in nature, hence, it would apply retrospectively w.e.f. 1st April, 1988. Secondly, it may be noted that, in the case of *Allied Motors (P) Ltd. etc:* v. *CIT* [1997] 139 CTR (SC) 364 : (1997) 224 ITR 677 (SC), the scheme of s. 43B of the Act came to be examined. In that case, the question which arose for determination was, whether sales-tax collected by the assessee and paid after the end of the relevant previous year but within the time allowed under the relevant sales-tax law should be disallowed under s. 43B of the Act while computing the business income of the previous year ? That was a case which related to asst. yr. 1984-85. The relevant accounting period ended on 30th June, 1983. The ITO disallowed the deduction claimed by the assessee which was on account of sales-tax collected by the assessee for the last quarter of the relevant accounting year. The deduction was disallowed under s. 43B which, as stated above, was inserted w.e.f. 1st April, 1984. It is also relevant to note that the first proviso which came into force w.e.f. 1st April, 1988 was not on the statute book when the assessments were made in the case of Allied Motors (P) Ltd. Etc. (supra). However, the assessee contended that even though the first proviso came to be inserted w.e.f. 1st April, 1988, it was entitled to the benefit of that proviso because it operated retrospectively from 1st April, 1984, when s. 43B stood inserted. This is how the question of retrospectivity arose in *Allied Motors (P) Ltd. etc.* (*supra*). This Court, in *Allied Motors (P) Ltd. etc.* (*supra*) held that when a proviso is inserted to remedy

unintended consequences and to make the section workable, a proviso which supplies an obvious omission in the section and which proviso is required to be read into the section to give the section a reasonable interpretation, it could be read retrospective in operation, particularly to give effect to the section as a whole. Accordingly, this Court, in *Allied Motors (P.) Ltd. etc.* (*supra*), held that the first proviso was curative in nature, hence, retrospective in operation w.e.f. 1st April, 1988. It is important to note once again that, by Finance Act, 2003, not only the second proviso is deleted but even the first proviso is sought to be amended by bringing about an uniformity in tax, duty, cess and fee on the one hand vis-a-vis contributions to welfare funds of employee(s) on the other. This is one more reason why we hold that the Finance Act, 2003, is retrospective in operation. Moreover, the judgment in *Allied Motors (P) Ltd. etc.* (*supra*) is delivered by a Bench of three learned Judges, which is binding on us. Accordingly, we hold that Finance Act, 2003, will operate retrospectively w.e.f. 1st April, 1988 (when the first proviso stood inserted). Lastly, we may point out the hardship and the invidious discrimination which would be caused to the assessee(s) if the contention of the Department is to be accepted that Finance Act, 2003, to the above extent, operated prospectively. Take an example - in the present case, the respondents have deposited the contributions with the R.P.F.C. after 31st March (end of accounting year) but before filing of the Returns under the IT Act and the date of payment falls after the due date under the Employees' Provident Fund Act, they will be denied deduction for all times. In view of the second proviso, which stood on the statute book at the relevant time, each of such assessee(s) would not be entitled to deduction under s. 43B of the Act for all times. They would lose the benefit of deduction even in the year of account in which they pay the contributions to the welfare funds, whereas a defaulter, who fails to pay the contribution to the welfare fund right upto 1st April, 2004, and who pays the contribution after 1st April, 2004, would get the benefit of deduction under s. 43B of the Act. In our view, therefore, Finance Act, 2003, to the extent indicated above, should be read as retrospective. It would, therefore, operate from 1st April, 1988, when the first proviso was introduced. It is true that the Parliament has explicitly stated that Finance Act, 2003, will operate w.e.f. 1st April, 2004. However, the matter before us involves the principle of construction to be placed on the provisions of Finance Act, 2003.

16. Before concluding, we extract hereinbelow the relevant observations of this Court in the case of *CIT* v. *J.H. Gotla* [1985] 48 CTR (SC) 363 : (1985) 156 ITR 323 (SC), which reads as under:

"We should find out the intention from the language used by the legislature and if strict literal construction leads to an absurd result, i.e., a result not intended to be subserved by the object of the legislation found in the manner indicated before, then if another construction is possible apart from strict literal construction, then that construction should be preferred to the strict literal construction. Though equity and taxation are often strangers, attempts should be made that these do not remain always so and if a construction results in equity rather than in injustice, then such construction should be preferred to the literal construction."

17. For the aforestated reasons, we hold that Finance Act, 2003, to the extent indicated above, is curative in nature, hence, it is retrospective and it would operate w.e.f. 1st April, 1988 (when the first proviso came to be inserted). For the above reasons, we find no merit in this batch of civil appeals filed by the Department which are hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.'

26. We are of the view that the reasoning of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of *Alom Extrusions Ltd*. (*supra*) will equally to the amendment to Sec.40(a)(ia) of the Act whereby a second proviso was inserted in sub-clause (ia) of clause (a) of Section 40 by the Finance Act, 2012, w.e.f. 1-4-2013. The provisions are intended to remove hardship. It was argued on behalf of the revenue that the existing provisions allow deduction in the year of payment and to that extent there is no hardship. We are of the view that the hardship in such an event would be taxing an Assessee on a higher income in one year and taxing him on lower income in a subsequent year. To the extent the Assessee is made to pay tax on a

higher income in one year, there would still be hardship.

27. As far as the appeal of the revenue is concerned, we find that the use of word "Payable", in Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act has created controversy as to whether payable includes amounts paid during the year. There were conflicting decisions rendered by the Tribunal.

> In the case of *DCIT* v. *Ashika Stock Broking Ltd*. reported in 44 SOT 556 the Hon'ble Kolkata ITAT has decided the matter in favour of revenue and after following its decision dated 15.01.2010 in the case of *Poddar Son's EXL. P Ltd* v. *ITO* in ITA No. 1418(Kol.)/09 has held that provisions of Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act are applicable to even sums paid during the year.
>
> In the case of *Teja Construction* v. *ACIT* reported in 39 SOT 13 the Hon'ble Hyderabad ITAT has decided the issue against the Revenue and has held that provisions of Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act are not applicable in respect of sums/amount paid during the year and which are not payable at end of the year on date of balance sheet, as it is applicable only in respect of "Payable amount" shown in balance sheet as outstanding expenses on which TDS has not been made. Similar laws were laid in various other cases.
>
> To resolve the above issue Special Bench was constituted and the Hon'ble Visakhapatnam Special Bench of ITAT in the case of *Merilyn Shipping & Transport* v. *Addl CIT* reported in 20 taxmann.com 244 has decided the issue against the Revenue and after comparing the proposed and enacted provision which is intended from the replacement of the words in the proposed and enacted provision from the words 'amount credited or paid' to 'payable' has held that it has to be concluded that provisions of Section 40(a)(ia) are applicable only to the amounts of expenditure which are payable as on the date 31st March of every year and it cannot be invoked to disallow expenditure which has been actually paid during the previous year, without deduction of TDS.

28. In *Sikandarkhan N. Tunvar* (*supra*), the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court held that in *Merilyn Shipping & Transport* (*supra*) the majority held that as the Finance Bill proposed the words "amount credited or paid" and as the Finance Act used the words "amounts payable", s. 40(a)(ia) could only apply to amounts that are outstanding as of 31st March and not to amounts already paid during the year. This view is not correct for two reasons. Firstly, a strict reading of s. 40(a)(ia) shows that all that it requires is that there should be an amount payable of the nature described, which is such on which tax is deductible at source but such tax has not been deducted or if deducted not paid before the due date. The provision nowhere requires that the amount which is payable must remain so payable throughout during the year. If the assessee's interpretation is accepted, it would lead to a situation where the assessee who though was required to deduct the tax at source but no such deduction was made or more flagrantly deduction though made is not paid to the Government, would escape the consequence only because the amount was already paid over before the end of the year in contrast to another assessee who would otherwise be in similar situation but in whose case the amount remained payable till the end of the year. There is no logic why the legislature would have desired to bring about such irreconcilable and diverse consequences. Secondly, the principle of deliberate or conscious omission is applied mainly when an existing provision is amended and a change is brought about. The Special Bench was wrong in comparing the language used in the draft bill to that used in the final enactment to assign a particular meaning to s. 40(a)(ia). Accordingly, Merilyn Shipping does not lay down correct law. The correct law is that s. 40(a)(ia) covers not only to the amounts which are payable as on 31st March of a particular year but also which are payable at any time during the year. The Hon'ble Kolkata High Court in *Md.Jakir Hossai Mondal* (*supra*) did not agree with the view of the Special

Bench in the case of *Merilyn Shipping & Transport* (*supra*) following its judgment on *CIT* v. *Crescent Export Syndicates* [2013] 216 Taxman 258/33 taxmann.com 250 (Cal.) holding that the views expressed in the case of *Merilyn Shipping & Transports* (*supra*) were not acceptable.

29. However, we find that the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court has however upheld the view taken by the Special Bench ITAT in the case of *Merilyn Shipping & Transports* (*supra*) in the case of *Vector Shipping Services (P.) Ltd.* (*supra*). The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Court were as follows:—

> "We do not find that the revenue can take any benefit from the observations made by the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of *Merilyn Shipping and Transport Ltd.* (136 1TD 23) (SB) quoted as above to the effect Section 40(a)(ia) was introduced in the Act by the Finance Act, 2004 with effect from 1.4.2005 with a view to augment the revenue through the mechanism of tax deduction at source. This provision was brought on statute to disallow the claim of even genuine and admissible expenses of the assessee under the head 'Income from Business and Profession' in case the assessee does not deduct TDS on such expenses. The default in deduction of TDS would result in disallowance of expenditure on which such TDS was deductible. In the present case tax was deducted as TDS from the salaries of the employees paid by M/s Mercator Lines Ltd., and the circumstances in which such salaries were paid by M/s Mercator Lines Ltd., for M/s Vector Shipping Services, the assessee were sufficiently explained.
>
> It is to be noted that for disallowing expenses from business and profession on the ground that TDS has not been deducted, the amount should be payable and not which has been paid by the end of the year.
>
> We do not find that the Tribunal has committed any error in recording the finding on the facts, which were not controverted by the department and thus the question of law as framed does not arise for consideration in the appeal.
>
> The income tax appeal is dismissed."

30. Thus there are two views on the issue, one in favour of the assessee expressed by the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court and the other against the assessee expressed by the Hon'ble Gujarat & Calcutta High Courts. Admittedly, there is no decision rendered by the jurisdictional High Court on this issue. In the given circumstances, following the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of *Vegetable Products Ltd.* (*supra*), we hold that where two views are possible on an issue, the view in favour of the assessee has to be preferred. Following the decision of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court, we uphold the order of the CIT(A).

31. In the result, the appeal by the revenue is dismissed, while the cross objection by the assessee is allowed.

SUNIL

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*In favour of assessee.